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BALANCING ANTITRUST AND LABOR
POLICIES ON THE COURT: WOOD v.
NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION
Antitrust law, principally embodied in the Sherman Act,' en-
couraged the development of a competitive market by prohibiting
the concerted actions of horizontal competitors seeking monopolis-
tic control.2 Concomitantly, labor laws, principally embodied in the
The Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-
7 (1982)). Section one provides in pertinent part:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, . .. , is declared to be
illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or
conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony ....
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). "Person," as defined in the Act, includes any individual, corporation or
association organized under any federal, territorial, foreign or state laws. See 15 U.S.C. § 7
(1982).
The broad and inclusive language of the Act has been interpreted as Congress' attempt
at exercising the full range of its power under the Commerce Clause. See United States v.
South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 558 (1944). "The [Sherman Act] has been
very ingeniously and properly drawn to cover every case which comes within what is called
the commercial power of Congress." 21 CONG. REC. 3147 (1890) (statement of Sen. George,
member of Senate Judiciary Committee responsible for redrafting the Act before its unani-
mous passage). See also 21 CONG. REC. 6314 (1890) (statement of Rep. Stewart) ("The provi-
sions of this trust bill are as broad, sweeping, and explicit as the English language can make
them to express the power of Congress over this subject. . . .") See generally T. VAKERICS,
ANTITRUST BASICS § 1.02(1) (1986) (overview of sections one and two of the Sherman Act); 1
J. VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION § 2.02(4) (1986) (discussing
legislative enactment and scope of Sherman Act).
The Sherman Act's broad language has also been expansively interpreted by the Su-
preme Court to allow it to meet the demands of an everchanging industrial marketplace. See
Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933) (Hughes, C.J.). See
also 21 CONG. REC. 2457 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman) (noting the proposed Act was
also intended to arm the federal courts with the power to assist state courts "in checking,
curbing, and controlling the most dangerous [unlawful] combinations").
2 See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 385-86 (1956);
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 50 (1911). Historically, federal antitrust stat-
utes were a codification of the common law policy which condemned as illegal all acts or
contracts that unduly restricted competition in the market. See Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader,
310 U.S. 469, 497-98 (1940); 1 J. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 1, § 1.01(2)(a). It should be
noted, however, that the Sherman Act, through subsequent judicial interpretations, enjoys a
greater breadth of scope than that of the common law prohibitions. See id. However, it is
clear that current judicial construction, which involves an adaptation of the law to changing
industrial conditions, still mirrors the common law approach. See id. § 1.01(2)(b). In addi-
tion, courts still find it necessary to refer to the common law when defining the terms or
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National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), were enacted to foster
collective bargaining agreements and thus maintains a decidedly
anticompetitive focus.4 Exemptions have been carved out of the
phrases of the federal statutes. See id. § 1.01(2)(c). "Congress has incorporated into the
Anti-Trust [sic] Acts the changing standards of the common law, and by so doing has dele-
gated to the courts the duty of fixing the standard for each case." United States v. Associ-
ated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), af'd, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
The motivating factor for passage of antitrust legislation was the growing congressional
concern that a few corporations were amassing significant economic power which would be
used to the detriment of the general public. See Standard Oil Co., 221 U.S. at 50. This
legislation also reflected a basic extension of congressional economic philosophy that a free
market was the most efficient way to allocate resources; which, in turn, would produce bet-
ter goods and services at lower prices. See National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United
States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978); Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 248-49 (1951). See
also P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW T 103 (1978) (objectives of antitrust law); T.
VAKERicS, supra note 1, § 1.01 (general overview of antitrust legislation).
The Sherman Act distinguishes between unilateral conduct and concerted action. See
Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 (1984). Unilateral conduct is
governed by section two which provides in pertinent part: "[e]very person who shall monop-
olize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to
monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States . . . shall be
deemed guilty of a felony." 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). Unlike section two, a section one violation
does not require proof that concerted activity threatens monopolization, with the result that
concerted actions under section one are scrutinized more than unilateral conduct under sec-
tion two. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984). Con-
sequently, restraints on trade without a combination or conspiracy are outside the purview
of section one. However, such conduct would constitute a section two violation. Id. at 767
n.13.
. The National Labor Relations Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982)). As originally enacted, the NLRA expressed a
decidedly pro-union position by stating that the causes of industrial unrest in the labor
relations area were caused by employers' activities. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982) (findings and
declaration of policy). Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have reflected this pro-union
position. See, e.g., United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 233 (1941) (protected union
activities include strike, picket and attempted boycott); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310
U.S. 469, 512-13 (1940) (antitrust laws not violated by disruptive union strike). See also
Marks, Labor and Antitrust: Striking a Balance Without Balancing, 35 Am. U.L. REv. 699,
706 (1986) (NLRA passage shifts Congressional approach "from a detached neutrality to
affirmative support of union organization").
4 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151, 157 (1982). Under the NLRA, it is the declared "policy of the
United States to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of
commerce" and when they have occurred to lessen or eradicate these problems "by encour-
aging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining." Id. § 151. Employees were given
"the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collec-
tively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activ-
ities for the purpose of collective bargaining." Id. § 157. "The practice and philosophy of
collective bargaining looks with suspicion on . . . individual advantages." J.I. Case Co. v.
NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 338 (1944). The essential character of labor unions is anticompetitive.
See J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPoRTs 549 (1979). See also McCormick & Mc-
Kinnon, Professional Football's Draft Eligibility Rule: The Labor Exemption and the Anti-
trust Laws, 33 EMORY L.J. 375, 383-84 (1984) (union's nature and purpose is against compe-
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antitrust statutes for labor unions in an attempted accommodation
of these Congressional policies.5 This inherent conflict nevertheless
tition); St. Antoine, Connell: Antitrust Law at the Expense of Labor Law, 62 VA. L. REV.
603, 604 (1976) (unions designed to limit competition).
To further the goal of industrial peace, the NLRA requires both the employer and the
union representatives to engage in collective bargaining concerning wages, hours, and work-
ing conditions. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982). Additionally, both parties are required to
meet at reasonable times and "confer in good faith." Id. However, such an obligation does
not require the parties reach an agreement or capitulate to the other's demands. See id.
Compare NLRB v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., 110 F.2d 632, 637 (4th Cir. 1940) (good faith
bargaining does not require a settlement) with NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 152-
53 (1956) (employer's failure to produce necessary data to justify bargaining position held
breach of good faith).
For a discussion on the fundamental principles of national labor policy, see generally P.
STAUDOHAR, THE SPORTS INDUSTRY AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 10 (1986) (three basic rights
form heart of labor policy); Jacobs & Winter, Antitrust Principles and Collective Bargain-
ing by Athletes: Of Superstars in Peonage, 81 YALE L.J. 1, 6 (1971) (two fundamental prin-
ciples-bargaining agent's exclusive power and freedom of contract between employer and
union); Marks, supra note 3, at 708 (national labor policy embodies four fundamental
principles).
5 See Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 731 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12,
13, 14-19, 20, 21, 22-27 and 29 U.S.C. §§ 52, 53 (1982)). Early application of antitrust laws to
union activities did not exempt unions from liability. See Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274, 278
(1908). Subsequently, Congress passed the Clayton Act to immunize unions from antitrust
scrutiny. See 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1982). See also United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 232
(1941) (unilateral union acts exempt from antitrust laws). However, where a union combines
with a group of employers to restrain trade in the market, statutory immunization is not
available. See Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 325 U.S.
797, 809 (1945). T. VAKERICS, supra note 1, § 13.05 (labor and management can form an
illegal combination under antitrust laws); Marks, supra note 3, at 726 (if union activity not
unilateral no statutory exemption).
The NLRA policy, while encouraging collective bargaining between employers and
union representatives, would normally be subject to antitrust scrutiny because it necessi-
tates joint union and non-union activity. See Marks, supra note 3, at 726-27; Note, Applica-
tion of Antitrust Laws to Professional Sports' Eligibility and Draft Rules, 46 Mo. L. REV.
797, 808 (1981). In order to protect collective bargaining agreements, the Supreme Court
evolved a nonstatutory labor exemption. See Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cut-
ters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965). The critical analysis in determining whether or
not a union-employer activity is immune from antitrust laws involves a balancing of the
restraint's impact on the market against the interests of the union. Id. at 690 n.5. In Jewel
Tea, Justice White upheld a marketing hours restriction as advancing the vital interests of
the union. Id. at 692. In UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965), however, Justice White
used the same balancing test to strike down an agreement that ran counter to the union's
interest even though it concerned a mandatory subject of collective bargaining. Id. at 666-
68. The Court in Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616
(1975), used this balancing approach to deny antitrust immunity to an agreement which
eliminated competition in the marketplace without advancing any union interests. See id. at
625-26. For a short summary of the scope of the nonstatutory labor exemption, see Note, Of
Hoops, Labor Dupes and Antitrust Ally-Oops: Fouling Out the Salary Cap, 62 IND. L.J. 95,
104 (1986) [hereinafter Note, Salary Cap].
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has crystallized in the unique battleground of professional sports.8
The applicability of federal antitrust law in the sports arena is well
established,' yet the courts have been left to define the scope of
those laws within the context of the collective bargaining process."
Recently, in Wood v. National Basketball Association,9 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that an ath-
lete's challenge to a collective bargaining agreement based on anti-
0 See United States v. National Football League, 116 F. Supp. 319, 323 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
See also Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 726 F.2d
1381, 1389 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984) (sports teams must cooperate to
produce product); Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (coopera-
tion among teams essential to produce product). Application of antitrust law is difficult in
professional sports because the teams compete on the field, yet in the economic market,
their success does not come at the expense of other teams. See Kempf, The Misapplication
of Antitrust Law to Professional Sports Leagues, 32 DE PAUL L. REV. 625, 627-32 (1983);
Note, The Super Bowl and the Sherman Act: Professional Team Sports and the Antitrust
Laws, 81 HARV. L. REV. 418, 419 (1967) [hereinafter Note, The Super Bowl]. See generally
Note, The Legality of Sports Leagues' Restrictive Admissions Practices, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv.
925, 932 (1985) (discussing unique structure of sports leagues).
7 See, e.g., Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957) (football); United
States v. International Boxing Club of N.Y., Inc., 348 U.S. 236 (1955) (professional boxing);
Gunter Harz Sports, Inc. v. United States Tennis Ass'n, 665 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1981) (ten-
nis); Blalock v. Ladies Professional Golf Ass'n, 359 F. Supp. 1260 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (golf);
Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462
(E.D. Pa. 1972) (hockey); Washington Professional Basketball Corp. v. National Basketball
Ass'n, 147 F. Supp. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (basketball).
The most notable exception to this general rule is professional baseball. See Federal
Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S.
200 (1922) (baseball not commerce and thus immune from antitrust scrutiny). Baseball's
anomalous exemption was reaffirmed fifty years later. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258
(1972). Justice Blackmun recognized that baseball involved interstate commerce but, bowing
to stare decisis, refused to lift the exemption. Id. at 282-84. See generally J. WEisTART & C.
LOWELL, supra note 4, at 480-89 (detailed discussion of baseball exemption).
' See Allen Bradley Co., 325 U.S. 797 (1945). Justice Black summarized the Court's
role as follows:
The result of all this is that we have two declared congressional policies which
it is our responsibility to try to reconcile. The one seeks to preserve a competitive
business economy; the other to preserve the rights of labor to organize to better its
conditions through the agency of collective bargaining. We must determine here
how far Congress intended activities under one of these policies to neutralize
the results envisioned by the other.
Id. at 806 (emphasis added). See also Roberts & Powers, Defining the Relationship Be-
tween Antitrust Law and Labor Law: Professional Sports and the Current Legal Back-
ground, 19 Wm. & MARY L. REV 395, 395 (1978); McCormick & McKinnon, supra note 4, at
386. This has not been an easy judicial task nor one that has been immune from criticism.
See Note, Salary Cap, supra note 5, at 96. See also Roberts, Sports Leagues and the Sher-
man Act: The Use and Abuse of Section 1 to Regulate Restraints on Intraleague Rivalry,
32 UCLA L. REv. 219, 222 n.4 (1984) (past judicial decisions have left sports leagues un-
guided and confused).
' 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987)
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trust violations so undermined fundamental national labor policies
as to be facially invalid.'
In Wood, the plaintiff, 0. Leon Wood, was selected in the first
round of the 1984 college draft by the Philadelphia 76ers basket-
ball team ("76ers").11 Under the terms of the modified collective
bargaining agreement between the National Basketball Association
("NBA"), its member-teams, and the National Basketball Players
Association ("NBPA"), Wood was offered only a one-year contract
at a predetermined minimum salary.12 This was the maximum the
76ers could offer Wood under the team "salary cap" provision in
the collective bargaining agreement. 3 Wood refused the proffered
contract and brought suit claiming that the college draft and the
salary cap were section one violations of the Sherman Act.14 Wood
sought a preliminary injunction restraining enforcement of the
NBA-NBPA agreement and requested that teams other than the
76ers be compelled to compete for his services outside the terms of
-0 Id. at 959.
" Id. at 958. Plaintiff was a talented college basketball player from California State
University at Fullerton and a gold-medal winner on the 1984 United States Olympic basket-
ball team. Id. at 956.
The draft refers to the system where the member-teams select eligible athletes and
obtain exclusive negotiating rights. See NBA-NBPA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT,
art. XXII, § 1(a)(1) (1980) [hereinafter NBA AGREEMENT]. The team with the worst won-
lost record selects first, with the remaining teams selecting in inverse order of their won-lost
records. See L. SOBEL, PROFESSIONAL SPORTS AND THE LAW 248 (1977). The selecting team
retains the draft rights for one year; if the player is not signed after that period, he is
eligible to be drafted again. See NBA AGREEMENT, supra, art. XXII, § 1(a)(2)(b). Moreover,
if the player is not re-drafted or sits out the second year, he then becomes eligible to sign
with any member-team. See id.
12 Wood, 809 F.2d at 958. The plaintiff's actions are in part an outgrowth of an earlier
antitrust suit brought by players against the NBA which resulted in a Settlement Agree-
ment on April 29, 1976, which modified the player draft and instituted a system for veteran
free agency. Id. at 957-58. In 1980, the NBA and NBPA incorporated this settlement into a
collective bargaining agreement which was later modified in 1983 by a Memorandum of Un-
derstanding ("Memorandum"). Id. at 957-58. This Memorandum continued the pre-existing
draft provisions and also included a floor on minimum individual salaries and a minimum
and maximum on aggregate team salaries known as the salary cap provisions. Id. at 957.
Wood was selected by the 76ers who had reached the maximum team salary and therefore
could only be offered a one-year, $75,000 contract. Id. at 958.
13 See id. See also supra note 12.
14 See Wood, 809 F.2d at 958. The court points out that the contract was a mere for-
mality intended by the 76ers to preserve their exclusive negotiating rights to Wood while
they attempted to rearrange their personnel to allow an offer of substantially more money.
Id. Wood declined to accept this proposition, contending that if he signed, he could expose
himself to a possibly career ending injury. See Wood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 602 F.
Supp. 525, 527 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
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the agreement.1" The United States District Court for the South-
ern District of New York denied Wood's motion, holding that the
salary cap and the college draft were protected by national labor
policy and were thereby exempt from the Sherman Act.16 Subse-
quently, the parties made an evidentiary submission to the district
court for a decision on the merits, and judgment was granted for
the defendants.1 7 On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed and de-
termined that an analysis of possible antitrust violations was an
unnecessary exercise where a claim seeks to subvert federal labor
policies.'
Writing for the court, Judge Winter"9 stated that the appel-
lant's antitrust claim must fail because it conflicts with two funda-
mental principles of labor law-a union's right to eliminate compe-
tition amongst themselves by selecting a bargaining agent20 and
the freedom of contract between parties to a collective agree-
ment.21 The court found that identical anticompetitive agreements
" See Wood, 809 F.2d at 958.
16 Wood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 602 F. Supp. 525, 528-29 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). The
court adopted the three-part test of Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 614-
15 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977), in determining whether the player
draft and salary cap were antitrust violations. See Wood, 602 F. Supp. at 528. The court
found that the draft and salary cap only affected the NBA and NBPA, were mandatory
subjects of bargaining under section 8(d) of the NLRA and were the product of bona fide
negotiations, thereby entitling them to antitrust exemption. Id. The court also held that the
NBA Agreement was binding on all those who were currently in the bargaining unit and all
others entering into it before its expiration. Id. at 529.
17 See Wood, 809 F.2d at 958. The evidentiary submission included the papers filed
with the preliminary motion and a stipulation of additional facts. Id.
18 Id. at 959-60.
19 It is noteworthy that Judge Winter was co-author of an article written on the issues
in this case. See id. at 958 n.1. Judge Winter's predilection towards national labor policy
was clearly evident when he stated that "national labor policy, rather than antitrust law, is
the principal and pre-eminent legal force shaping employment relationships in professional
sports." Jacobs & Winter, supra note 4, at 6.
20 See Wood, 809 F.2d at 959. The National Labor Relations Act provides that
"[r]epresentatives... selected... by the majority of the employees in a unit.., shall be the
exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective
bargaining. . . ... 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982). The court pointed out that national labor pol-
icy encourages collective rather than individual bargaining strength. See Wood, 809 F.2d at
959. Once a representative is chosen, an individual is forbidden from separately negotiating
with the employer even if individual negotiations would lead to enhanced compensation. See
id.
21 Id. at 961. The court asserted that freedom of contract between the parties to a col-
lective agreement is an important foundation of labor policy for two reasons: the negotiating
parties know best what provisions fit their particular needs; and it furthers the pursuit of
labor peace by leaving untouched the number of available compromises the parties may
avail themselves to in solving their differences. See id.
1987]
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existed in the industrial marketplace, and allowing an attack on
such agreements would lead to a collapse of federal labor policy
unless unwarranted judicial exceptions were made.22 Judge Winter
conceded Wood's economic disadvantage under these restraints,
but noted that even if they were illegal and discriminatory, Wood's
only cognizable remedy would be for breach of the duty of fair rep-
resentation against the NBPA.23
Although the Wood court has sought to protect national labor
policy from antitrust attack, it is submitted that the court's sole
reliance on labor principles was both unnecessary and unprece-
dented. Moreover, the Wood court's rejection of any antitrust anal-
ysis leaves untouched prohibitive restraints on the players' services
market. This Comment will examine the weaknesses in using a uni-
lateral labor approach and will propose that antitrust analysis fur-
nishes the proper focus in professional sports by accommodating
both labor and antitrust goals.
LABOR POLICY REIGNS SUPREME
In order to effectuate national labor policy, it has become nec-
essary to shield certain union activities from free competition.24 It
is within a court's province to delineate the extent to which collec-
tive bargaining agreements are subject to antitrust scrutiny.25 Tra-
ditionally, this has involved a two-step approach-a finding as to
22 See id. at 960-61. Wood claimed that his unique athletic skills entitled him to bar-
gain individually, but the court pointed out that industrial agreements routinely set wages
for employees with varying capabilities. See id. at 960. The court analogized the exclusivity
of the college draft to the union hiring hall where employees are referred to a particular
employer and either work where directed or do not work. See id. The court also noted that
in typical industrial settings new employees and employees outside the bargaining unit regu-
larly find themselves disadvantaged with regard to salaries, layoffs, and promotions, as se-
niority clauses benefit incumbent employees. See id.
23 Id. at 962. Conceding this disadvantage, the court held that "Wood has offered us no
reason whatsoever to fashion a rule based on antitrust grounds prohibiting agreements be-
tween employers and players that use seniority as a criterion for certain employment deci-
sions." Id. (emphasis omitted). See also infra note 31.
24 See, e.g., Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421
U.S. 616, 622 (1975) (boycotts and secondary picketing exempt); UMW v. Pennington, 381
U.S. 657, 662 (1965) (Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts provide exemptions to Sherman
Act for labor unions); Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co.,
381 U.S. 676, 689 (1965) (union-employer agreements on wages, hours, working conditions
exempt). See also Roberts & Powers, supra note 8, at 417 (Congress and courts provided
shields for labor activities).
11 See Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 325 U.S.
797, 806 (1945); Note, Salary Cap, supra note 5, at 96; supra note 8.
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whether a union activity is entitled to an exemption from antitrust
standards,26 and, if not, a determination as to the possibility of an
antitrust violation.27 The Second Circuit in Wood intentionally
omitted this analysis by denying the applicability of antitrust law
when a union member challenges a collective bargaining agree-
ment."' Judge Winter summarily dismissed the alleged antitrust vi-
olations thereby taking an unprecedented judicial leap favoring la-
bor law preeminence.29 Moreover, the court suggested that a union
member may obtain relief from an egregious antitrust violation
based on a breach of duty of fair representation against the bar-
gaining representative.3 0 This, however, is an essentially hollow
remedy that serves as an inadequate substitute for a viable anti-
trust analysis.3 1
The union's right to select an exclusive bargaining agent cou-
pled with the freedom to contract are the two fundamental labor
21 See supra note 5 (discussing development of both statutory and non-statutory labor
exemptions).
27 See infra notes 57-62 and accompanying text (discussion of per se and rule of reason
violations).
29 See Wood, 809 F.2d at 959; Stoll & Goldfein, Over the Limit, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 18, 1987,
at 2, col. 1.
20 See Wood, 809 F.2d at 957. The majority of courts and commentators had balanced
or formed some type of antitrust analysis when addressing these issues. See, e.g., McCourt
v. California Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193, 1197 n.7 (6th Cir. 1979) (player restraints subject
to antitrust); Wood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 602 F. Supp. 525, 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)
(applying three prong antitrust test to justify labor exemption); Smith v. Pro Football, Inc.,
420 F. Supp. 738, 742 (D.D.C. 1976), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir.
1978) (collective bargaining agreement not automatically exempt from antitrust law); J.
WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 4, at 585-86 (automatic exemption too broad); Note,
Application of the Labor Exemption After the Expiration of Collective Bargaining Agree-
ments in Professional Sports, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 164, 178 (1982) (no court ever allowed labor
principles to override antitrust laws automatically when players challenged collective bar-
gaining). But see UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 672 (1965) (Goldberg, J., dissenting)
(labor exemption should automatically shield mandatory bargaining subjects in collective
agreements); Jacobs & Winter, supra note 4, at 21 (antitrust law has no applicability to
terms in collective bargaining agreement).
10 See Wood, 809 F.2d at 962.
31 Breach of duty of fair representation only occurs when the bargaining agent acts in
an arbitrary or detrimental manner against a union member. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S.
171, 190 (1967). Union representatives have been given wide discretion in negotiations and
have been allowed to reach agreements clearly discriminatory towards some employees. See
Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 349-50 (1964). Courts are willing to allow these "harms"
absent hostile or arbitrary bargaining actions. See id. It is unlikely that Wood would be able
to sustain his burden of proof as to unfair representation by the NBPA. See J. WEISTART &
C. LOWELL, supra note 4, at 547; Jacobs & Winter, supra note 4, at 18-21. For additional
case law and commentary on the duty of fair representation, see J. WEiSTART & C. LOWELL,
supra note 4, at 545 n.404.
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principles upon which the Wood court based its rationale.2 As to
the former, Judge Winter concluded that recognizing Wood's claim
would undermine the union representative's effectiveness and re-
duce the salary potential for other players in the league.3 The Sec-
ond Circuit, however, ignored contractual reality by failing to ac-
knowledge that the right to individually negotiate salaries was
expressly reserved to the players in the collective bargaining agree-
ment.3 4 Additionally, the court offers no support to justify its sug-
gestion that other players would necessarily receive less compensa-
tion if Wood were free to negotiate in an unrestrained market.3 5
Freedom of contract contravenes judicial interference in an
area where the negotiating parties seek solutions to fit their partic-
ular needs, and also fosters labor peace by increasing the number
of negotiable solutions s.3  The practical effect of this philosophy
holds that provisions in a collective bargaining agreement must
necessarily be shielded from antitrust standards; yet this position
has never been adopted and has, in fact, been rejected by the Su-
preme Court.3 7 By refusing to look past the NBA-NBPA agree-
32 See Wood, 809 F.2d at 959-61; Stoll & Goldfein, supra note 28, at 2, col. 4. See also
supra notes 21-22.
" See Wood, 809 F.2d at 961.
"' See NBA AGREEMENT, supra note 11, art. I, § 3 (right to negotiate individual sala-
ries). Accepting the fact that new employees are disadvantaged by the draft and the salary
cap, the Second Circuit rationalized this inequity as an example of restraints found" in the
industrial marketplace caused by seniority provisions. Wood, 809 F.2d at 962.
"I See id. at 961. If other players were to receive less compensation if Wood were to
negotiate freely, a viable and equitable alternative would be for the owners to share league
revenues equally. This in turn would enable each team to competitively bid for players'
services, secure league financial stability and allow players like Wood to receive their market
value without leaving less for other players. See generally Professional Sports: Has Anti-
trust Killed the Goose that Laid the Golden Egg?, 45 ANTITRUST L.J. 290, 299 (1976) [here-
inafter Professional Sports] (statement of I. Millstein) (antitrust laws apply to all competi-
tors who must learn to survive without judicial largesse).
3 See Wood, 809 F.2d at 961. See also H. WELLINGTON, LABOR AND THE LEGAL PROCESS
49-90 (1968) (freedom of contract integral to national labor policy); Weiler, Striking a New
Balance: Freedom of Contract and the Prospects For Union Representation, 98 HARv. L.
REv. 351, 377 (1984) (collective agreement properly allocates resources based on parties'
needs).
27 See Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676,
684 n.3, 688-89 (1965) (majority rejected automatic antitrust exemption for mandatory sub-
jects of collective bargaining as a means of effectuating national labor policy). Accord UMW
v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 665 (1965). See also Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 294 (1972)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (" 'benefits to organized labor cannot be utilized as a cat's-paw to
pull employer's chestnuts out of the antitrust fires' ") (quoting United States v. Women's
Sportswear Mfrs. Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460, 464 (1949)); Marks, supra note 3, at 752 (little prece-
dent to exempt agreements on mandatory bargaining subjects from antitrust).
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ment, the court assumed that the union reached this agreement
without internal conflicts of interest38 and that reasonable and
more efficient alternatives were not readily available.39 While a
court's function does not extend to rewriting collective bargaining
agreements, 0 it is suggested that a failure to strike down provi-
sions which violate antitrust laws, in the name of labor peace or for
fear of the collapse of national labor policy, is more harmful than
forcing parties to rework stricken provisions.
The Wood court attempted to buttress blanket immunity for
the player draft and salary cap by analogizing these restraints to
hiring halls and seniority clauses which are commonly protected in
the industrial marketplace. 4 The justification for allowing those
restraints derives from the need "to eliminate wasteful, time-con-
suming, and repetitive scouting for jobs by individual workmen
and haphazard uneconomical searches by employers .... ,,42 It is
self-evident that no such justification exists in the operation of a
professional sports league; conversely, the player draft and salary
Absolute non-intervention into collective bargaining has also been rejected by Congress.
See L. SOBEL, supra note 11, at 327. For example, the Fair Labor Standards Act establishes
minimum wages and maximum hours and the Occupational Safety and Health Act specifies
working conditions; neither can be avoided by a collective agreement. See id.
38 See Weiler, supra note 36, at 376-77. In most unions, including the NBPA, senior
employees prefer increased fringe benefits or pension provisions over wages. See id. In an
analogous setting, journeymen entertainers and star performers agree collectively only on a
base level of compensation while leaving additional benefits to be negotiated separately. See
id. at 376-77.
-' See infra note 67.
40 See NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322, 328-29 (1974) (Stewart, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); NLRB v. Burn Int'l Sec. Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 283-84
(1972); H.K. Porter & Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 107-09 (1970). However, support for judi-
cial restraint does not sanction antitrust violations and a court will strike down such viola-
tions when necessary. See, e.g., Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 623 (8th
Cir. 1976) (supported judicial non-intervention on substantive details but struck down pro-
visions of collective agreement as violative of antitrust law), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801
(1977).
41 See Wood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 809 F.2d 954, 960 (2d Cir. 1987). See also J.
WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 4, at 554 (applying hiring hall analogy to professional
sports); Jacobs & Winter, supra note 4, at 17 (same).
42 Local 357, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667, 672 (1961) (quoting
Mountain Pac. Chapter, 119 N.L.R.B. 883, 896 n.8 (1958)). Discriminatory hiring hall prac-
tices are allowed in the construction trade because of unique employment considerations.
See NLRB v. Houston Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors of America, Inc., 349 F.2d 449,
452 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1026 (1966). Cf. McCormick & McKinnon, supra
note 4, at 409-10 (distinguishing hiring hall arrangement with professional football draft
eligibility rule). See also Note, Salary Cap, supra note 5, at 113-116 (rebutting use of hiring
ball analogy in professional basketball setting).
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cap create obstacles for prospective employees.43 Judicial support
for hiring hall exemptions has normally been confined to those po-
sitions in industry with frequent employment turnover, seasonal
labor supply requirements or employee unfamiliarity with particu-
lar job functions, situations clearly inapposite to the employment
of a professional basketball player.44 It is submitted that the court
missed the distinguishing feature between sports and industry,
namely, that individual players are free to negotiate salaries based
on their athletic skills within the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement while their industrial counterparts may not. Therefore,
the restraints impact uniquely on ballplayers.
The fundamental weakness in the Wood decision lies in its
failure to accommodate a basic doctrine of economic pol-
icy-market freedom under the Sherman Act.45 This policy de-
mands at the minimum equal consideration with national labor
policy. 46 Arbitrary condemnation of collective bargaining agree-
ments is both contrary to congressional policy and damaging to la-
bor harmony.47 However, a majority of courts have recognized that
exempting labor practices or shielding them from antitrust attack
must be cautiously granted.48 Moreover, no prior court has auto-
matically allowed labor policy to override antitrust policy or sug-
gested that encouraging competition for players' services is not an
13 See Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867, 891-92 (S.D.N.Y.
1975), aff'd, 556 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1977); J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 4, at 504; L.
SOBEL, supra note 11, at 259; Note, Salary Cap, supra note 5, at 115.
1' See Local 357, Int'l Bhd. Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667, 672 (1961); NLRB v.
Houston Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors of America, Inc., 349 F.2d 449, 452 (5th Cir.
1965); Note, Salary Cap, supra note 5, at 115.
11 See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972). The Sherman Act
has been likened to the "Magna Carta of free enterprise" and as important to economic
freedom as the "Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms."
Id. at 610. See also Note, The National Basketball Association Salary Cap: An Antitrust
Violation?, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 157, 170 (1985) (noting importance of Sherman Act)
46 See Note, supra note 45, at 170; Professional Sports, supra note 35, at 309 (state-
ment of I. Millstein) (antitrust laws paramount to labor laws). But see J. WEISTART & C.
LOWELL, supra note 4, at 557-58 (labor policy disallows individual challenges to collective
agreements); Jacobs & Winter, supra note 4, at 6 (labor law is pre-eminent legal force in
professional sports).
47 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151, 158(d) (1982). See also supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
" See Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 733 (1973);
United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305, 316 (1956). See also United
States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350-51 (1963) ("Repeals of the antitrust
laws by implication from a regulatory statute are strongly disfavored .... "). Cf. Otter Tail
Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 374 (1973) (even in non-legislated areas, courts
hesitant to hold that Congress intended override of antitrust laws).
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antitrust concern when a collective bargaining agreement exists.4
Since labor policy cannot justify substantial restraints in the mar-
ket,50 it is submitted that a proper judicial analysis concerning
player restraints contained in collective bargaining agreements
must reconcile the conflict between labor and antitrust principles
without a wholesale subversion of either precept.
ACCOMMODATING LABOR AND ANTITRUST: THE RULE OF REASON
APPROACH
The traditional approach in analyzing whether a collective
bargaining agreement's provisions will be shielded from antitrust
scrutiny initially requires a determination that the provision fits
into a labor exemption." Various formulas utilized in the profes-
sional sports arena 2 have attempted to incorporate industrial la-
bor exemptions with varying results. 3 Functionally, these exemp-
tions were intended to protect unions in their collective bargaining
activities in order to further legitimate employee interests. 4 In the
49 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
1o See Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867, 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
(" '[m]andatory subjects of collective bargaining' do not carry talismanic immunity from the
antitrust laws"), aff'd, 556 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1977); Mackey v. National Football League, 543
F.2d 606, 621 (8th Cir. 1976) (court rejected labor related justification for unreasonable re-
straint on player's mobility), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977). See also Marks, supra
note 3, at 764 (labor policy does not engender substantial restraint).
5' See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
52 See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 614-15. The Mackey court used a three-prong test: (1) the
restraint only affects parties to the agreement; (2) the agreement must be a mandatory sub-
ject for collective bargaining; and (3) the agreement must be bona fide arm's length negotia-
tion. Id. If all three parts are satisfied, then the nonstatutory exemption applies. Id. Both
sides in the Wood case assumed this was the test the Second Circuit would use in its deci-
sion. See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 21-28, Wood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 809 F.2d
954 (2d Cir. 1987) (No. 86-7173); Brief of Defendant-Appellee National Basketball Ass'n at
15-30, Wood V. National Basketball Ass'n, 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987) (No. 86-7173).
Other formulations have included a variation on the Mackey test that has relaxed some
of its requirements. See McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193, 1203 (6th Cir.
1979). In contrast, courts have also adopted a more restrictive test than that in Mackey. See
Kapp v. National Football League, 390 F. Supp. 73, 86 (N.D. Cal. 1974), af'd, 586 F.2d 644
(9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 907 (1979). A severely restricted test for the nonstatu-
tory labor exemption was previously adopted by Judge Carter, district court judge in the
Wood case. See Robertson, 389 F. Supp. at 888-89.
53 Compare Mackey, 543 F.2d at 622 ("Rozelle Rule" violative of antitrust laws) with
McCourt, 600 F.2d at 1203 (reserve system entitled to nonstatutory exemption). See also
Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distribu-
tion, Horizontal Aferger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 282, 325
(1975) (criticism of Supreme Court antitrust analysis).
54 See, e.g., Mackey, 543 F.2d at 617 (statutory exemption enacted to benefit unions by
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sports industry, however, they are being used by employers seek-
ing a derivative immunity from antitrust liability.5 Paradoxically,
a union is prohibited from trying to shield restraints from antitrust
liability when the restraints run counter to a union's interests;"
yet their employers may be permitted to do just that under collec-
tive bargaining. It is submitted, therefore, that the initial exemp-
tion determination is functionally inoperative in the sports indus-
try because it exempts provisions without any antitrust
consideration and should be abandoned in favor of an antitrust ap-
proach which recognizes that the employer and not the union seeks
immunity from antitrust liability.
There are certain trade practices that so blatantly restrain
competition that they result in a per se violation of antitrust
laws. 57 The trend, however, is against per se applicability in the
unique sphere of professional sports.58 The member-teams in the
exempting some activities from antitrust scrutiny). See also Note, The National Hockey
League Reserve System: A Restraint of Trade?, 56 J. URB. LAW 467, 494 (1979) (unions
being sued sought to invoke nonstatutory labor exemption); Note, supra note 29, at 175
(non-sport cases concerned with labor's anticompetitive activities).
55 See Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F.
Supp. 462, 499-500 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Mackey 543 F.2d at 612 n.10 ("To preserve the integrity
of the negotiating process, employers who bargain in good faith must be entitled to claim
the antitrust exemption."). See also Roberts & Powers, supra note 8, at 434 (underpinning
of exemption is national labor policy favoring collective bargaining entitling employers to
same immunities); Jacobs & Winter, supra note 4, at 26 (nonstatutory cases discussed ex-
emption of unions and employers in collective bargaining). But see Note, supra note 45, at
163 (employers not entitled to use exemption since it was created to benefit union interests
and NBPA derives no benefit from salary cap).
" See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 294-96 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Lowes v.
Pennington, 400 F.2d 806, 814 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 983 (1968); Kapp v. National
Football League, 390 F. Supp. 73, 86 (N.D. Cal. 1974), aff'd, 586 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 441 U.S. 907 (1979). See also L. SOBEL, supra note 11, at 328 (union or em-
ployer may not reach an agreement violating other laws even if it concerns mandatory bar-
gaining subjects); Jacobs & Winter, supra note 4, at 10 (bargaining representative must
represent union's interests in settlement negotiations).
57 See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (division of mar-
kets); Klor's, Inc., v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207 (1959) (group boycotts); Northern
Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958) (tying arrangements); United States v.
Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (price fixing). The per se approach has also
been applied in the sports industry. See, e.g., Haywood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 401
U.S. 1204 (1971) (group boycott against basketball player); Blalock v. Ladies Professional
Golf Ass'n, 359 F. Supp. 1260, 1265-66 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (group boycott against golfer). See
generally Comanor, Vertical, Territorial and Customer Restrictions: White Motor and Its
Aftermath, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1419-21 (1968) (discussing early development of per se
illegality)
58 See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 86 (1984) (rule
of reason approach determined college broadcasting rights); Mackey, 543 F.2d at 619 (pro-
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league must cooperate in order to produce their product yet re-
main fiercely competitive on the playing field.59 This demands a
balanced approach focusing on the restraint's effect on competitive
conditionsAo The rule of reason approach analyzes the justification
for the restraint s' and considers whether less restrictive means
might better achieve those ends. 2 It is submitted that this analysis
affords a better accommodation of labor and antitrust policies as it
allows member-team cooperation while protecting against unrea-
sonable restraints in the players' services market. Moreover, the
rule of reason would subject only those restraints which unreason-
ably restrain competition to antitrust scrutiny thereby allaying any
fears of a national labor policy collapse.
The Wood court acknowledged that the player draft and sal-
ary cap put new players at an economic disadvantage. 3 Under a
rule of reason analysis, the NBA could try and justify these re-
straints by claiming that they insure on field competition and
fessional football); Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. at 503-04 (profes-
sional hockey). Cf. United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351, 1365-69 (5th Cir.
1980) (rule of reason approach justified real estate boards' concerted actions despite appear-
ance of per se violation); Worthen Bank & Trust Co. v. National BankAmericard, Inc., 485
F.2d 119, 126-27, 128 n.7 (8th Cir. 1973) (cooperative system among banks allowed under
rule of reason as necessary for national credit card system), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 918
(1974). See also, Marks, supra note 3, at 757 (majority of cases apply rule of reason). But
see Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 354-55 (1982) (per se doctrine
still viable).
11 See supra note 6 and accompanying text. Congress has statutorily recognized that
professional sports is not the only industry where unrestrained competition is undesirable.
See 6 J. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 1, § 50.01 (agriculture, insurance, labor).
"o See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918). Justice Brandeis
formulated the rule of reason as follows:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed ... merely regulates and
perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it ... may suppress or even
destroy competition. To determine that... the court must ordinarily consider the
facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before
and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect,
actual or probable.
Id. at 238.
"1 See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 23 (1979); White Motor Co. v. United
States, 372 U.S. 253, 270 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring); Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United
States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). See also S. RIVKIN, GOVERNMENT AND THE SPORTS BUSINESS,
401 (R. Noll ed. 1974) (courts willing to examine justification of restraints).
02 White Motor Co., 372 U.S. at 271 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring). See also Note,
Salary Cap, supra note 5, at 122 (restraints should be no more restrictive than necessary).
11 See supra note 23. Adding to this economic burden is the brevity of an athlete's
playing career and the fact that loss of even one year's salary potential can be detrimental.
See Linseman v. World Hockey Ass'n, 439 F. Supp. 1315, 1319 (D. Conn. 1977). See also P.
STAUDOHAR, supra note 4, at 147 (average NBA career about four years).
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thereby enhance customer satisfaction. 4 In addition, the draft and
salary cap may be deemed essential to achieving financial stabil-
ity. 5 New players, on the other hand, could counterbalance these
justifications with proof that these restraints do not enhance intra-
league competition and only provide financial stability at the play-
ers' expense. 6 In addition, viable, less restrictive alternatives on a
player's mobility and earning capacity would necessarily and equi-
tably entail greater employer contributions in an area of legitimate
employer concern.6 7 The collective bargaining process would still
be the appropriate channel used in resolving these issues once the
courts no longer allow this process to shield illegal provisions."' It
is asserted that under this approach, the Wood court could have
found the player draft and salary cap illegal restraints. Further,
Judge Winter's approach recognized team-member needs at the ex-
pense of prohibitive player restraints in the name of national labor
policy.
CONCLUSION
The Second Circuit's failure to incorporate antitrust principles
as the basis for its decision in Wood was an unprecedented depar-
ture that validated market restraints in professional sports without
a consideration of their deleterious effects. The Wood court did
not acknowledge the many distinguishing characteristics between
" See Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867, 892 (S.D.N.Y. 1975),
afl'd, 556 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1977); J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 4, at 504-05; L.
SOBEL, supra note 11, at 251; Note, The Super Bowl, supra note 6, at 421.
" See Brief for Defendant-Appellee National Basketball Ass'n at 7-9, Wood v. National
Basketball Ass'n, 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987) (No. 86-7173); Note, supra note 45, at 157;
Note, Salary Cap, supra note 5, at 106.
" See Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 738, 746 (D.D.C. 1976), affd in part,
rev'd in part, 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978); S. RivKIN, supra note 61, at 415; L. SOBEL,
supra note 11, at 253-54. See also Berger, Essay: After the Strikes: Reexamination of Pro-
fessional Baseball's Exemption from Antitrust Laws, 45 U. Prrr. L. Rav. 209, 225 (1983)
(even in the face of supposed financial hardship, owners still confident enough to make sig-
nificant monetary commitments).
" See Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 620-22 (8th Cir. 1976), cert.
dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977); Note, supra note 45, at 177-80; Note, The Super Bowl,
supra note 6, at 424-25. See also Professional Sports, supra note 35, at 313 (if balance is
essential, owners should share all league revenues equally instead of capping team salaries).
8" See UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 665 (1965). "[T]here are limits to what a
union or an employer may offer or extract in the name of wages, and because they must
bargain does not mean that the agreement reached may disregard other laws." Id. See also
Local 24 Teamsters Union v. Olivers, 358 U.S. 283, 296 (1959) (federal law sets limits on
what collective bargaining agreements may provide).
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the sports and industrial marketplaces. A properly focused anti-
trust analysis, using the rule of reason approach, would be the
most effective and equitable tool to reconcile labor and antitrust
concerns. Protecting the integrity of collective bargaining agree-
ments, fostering national labor policy and freeing the player's mar-
ket from unreasonable restraints are all within the realm of the
court's responsibility.
Richard J. Haray
